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Hantavirus Transmission
in the United States
The public health significance of New World
hantaviruses (genus Hantavirus, family Bunya-
viridae) was first recognized in 1993 when healthy
young adults in the southwestern United States
contracted a mysterious pulmonary illness and
died. The ensuing investigation identified a novel
hantavirus, Sin Nombre virus (SNV), as the
cause of a new syndrome, hantavirus pulmonary
syndrome (HPS). A case-control study performed
early in the outbreak showed that high density
peridomestic rodent populations were a key risk
factor for disease (1), a finding consistent with
knowledge of Old World hantaviruses (including
Puumala, Seoul, Hantaan, and Dobrava viruses),
which can cause hemorrhagic fever with renal
syndrome (HFRS) in humans who inhale aero-
solized excreta from infected rodents (2). Thou-
sands of episodes of HFRS occur in Eurasia each
year, yet person-to-person transmission has
never been reported. When person-to-person
transmission of a hantavirus was suggested by
the results of an HPS outbreak investigation in
southern Argentina (3), we reviewed the epide-
miology of HPS in the United States for evidence
of nosocomial or secondary transmission.
Since 1993, a U.S. HPS registry has been
maintained that includes surveillance case reports,
environmental and epidemiologic case inves-
tigations, patients’ medical records, and labora-
tory databases. This registry was used to identify
the clusters of hantaviral infections shown in the
Figure. A cluster was defined as the association
of a patient with confirmed HPS with one or more
contacts who had both laboratory evidence of
SNV infection and a history of a febrile illness
within 8 weeks of the onset of symptoms.
Presence of serum immunoglobulin M (IgM) or
IgG reacting with SNV antigen or immuno-
histochemical detection of SNV antigen in autopsy
specimens was accepted as laboratory evidence of
In 1996, investigation of a hantavirus pulmonary syndrome (HPS) outbreak in
southern Argentina found evidence of person-to-person transmission of a hantavirus.
The infection control ramifications of this finding led to this review of hantavirus
epidemiology in the United States; the review suggests that Sin Nombre virus infection
is rarely, if ever, transmitted from person to person and that existing guidelines for
prevention of HPS remain appropriate for North America.
SNV infection. Eight weeks was  selected as a
conservative estimate of the incubation period on
the basis of HFRS occurrence among United
Nations (U.N.) military personnel within 7 days
of arrival in (and as long as 46 days after
departure from) a hantavirus-endemic area (4).
We identified five clusters (involving 12
patients) of hantaviral infections (Figure). The
interval between cases was much shorter than 8
weeks in each instance, and contact between the
linked patients from episodes 1, 3, and 4 occurred
before patients were admitted to a hospital. All
infected persons could have been exposed to
rodent excreta in their home or work environ-
ments. Exposure risk was documented by results
of rodent trapping in episodes 2, 3, and 4  (Table).
In episodes 1 and 5, the men had been sleeping and
working in rural environments where rodent infes-
tation was noted, but trapping was not performed.
Viral products were amplified from the second
of the two agricultural workers in episode 4 and
from rodents captured at the ranch visited by the
two men. The rodent and human viral sequences
differed sufficiently to suggest that the second
man’s infection had been acquired elsewhere
(S. St. Jeor, pers. comm.). Viral products could
not be obtained from the other agricultural
worker or from patients in the other clusters.
The U.S. case registry has on file 160 patients
with clinical and laboratory evidence of HPS.
Household or social contacts (n=320) of 40 of
these HPS patients (including the HPS patients
in the Figure) have been tested for antibodies
that react with SNV antigen. Most contacts were
household members or work colleagues of
patients in whom HPS was diagnosed during
the 1993 outbreak; testing sera from contacts of
patients has not been routine in later years. Of
these 320 household or social contacts, 310 had
no serologic evidence of hantaviral infection,362 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 3, July–September 1997
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Figure. Clusters of hantaviral infections in the United States.*
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three had IgG that reacted with SNV antigen
(SNV-IgG) but no illness, one had SNV-IgG and
was diagnosed with HPS retrospectively (episode
1, Figure), and six had IgM that reacted with SNV
antigen (SNV-IgM). Four of the six contacts with
SNV-IgM had confirmed cases of HPS (episodes 2
and 5), and two had a clinical course not con-
sistent with that of HPS (episodes 3 and 4) (5).
While person-to-person transmission cannot be
ruled out, these data may simply reflect common
exposure of the persons involved to infected rodents.
Nosocomial transmission of HPS has never
been documented in the United States. In 1993, a
survey of 396 health-care workers from New
Mexico examined evidence of nosocomial trans-
mission of HPS (6). Although 266 of these wor-
kers recalled recent exposure to a patient with
HPS, none became ill with HPS or had serologic
evidence of infection with SNV. Statistically, this
estimate could have been obtained (with 95%
confidence intervals) if true hantaviral sero-
prevalence among these workers was < 3%.
During the first month of the 1993 outbreak,
health-care workers inconsistently adhered to
precautions to avoid respiratory or blood contact.
Small numbers of needlestick exposures and
mouth-to-mouth resuscitation attempts did not
result in documented hantavirus infection (F.
Koster, pers. comm.). The only health-care wor-
ker in the United States to have a documented
SNV infection had evidence of peridomestic
rodent infestation and no known contact with
other HPS patients. HFRS was not seen in
attendants, nurses, doctors, or research workers
involved in caring for more than 3,000 U.N.
military personnel who contracted HFRS in
Korea during the early 1950s (2).
In contrast, one hospital receptionist and five
doctors were among the 20 patients involved in
the HPS outbreak in southern Argentina (3).
Only two of the six recalled seeing rodents in
the 6 weeks before onset of HPS; and when
trapping was performed in the homes of four of
these persons, no evidence of rodent infestation
was found and no rodents were captured (J.
Mills, pers. comm.).
While HPS in Argentinean health-care wor-
kers was unexpected, clustering of HPS patients
is in keeping with rodent-borne zoonoses. Small
localized clusters of HFRS were not uncommon
among U.N. troops in Korea, with 1- to 3-week
intervals between the onset of symptoms in the
first and last patients (7). A cross-sectional study
of hantavirus antibody prevalence in rural China
identified localized clustering of HFRS patients,
but the association between patients with HFRS
was not statistically significant (8). Outbreaks of
HFRS among laboratory workers also is well
recognized. Epidemiologic investigation of one
such outbreak found no hantaviral infections in
household contacts of 113 persons who became
infected after entering a building that housed a
laboratory colony of infected rodents (9).
Electron microscopy and immunohisto-
chemical studies of tissues from HPS patients
suggest why these viruses may have such a low
propensity to cause secondary hantaviral infec-
tions in humans. Despite immunohistochemical
examination of tissues from HPS patients
showing high levels of hantaviral antigens in the
pulmonary microvasculature, mature virus par-
ticles are rarely visualized (10). Disease in
humans appears to result from an overwhelming
immunologic response after exposure to hanta-
viral antigens. The direct cytopathic effects of
virus on host cells (as seen in some other devas-
tating viral infections, such as that caused by
Ebola virus) is not a feature of HPS. Differences
in infectiousness could reflect
the extent of viral replication
and spread before the immune
response becomes active or
failure of  the immune response
to promptly eradicate virus.
Although infected rodents
develop antibodies that react
with hantaviral antigens, they
do not have the immuno-
logically mediated manifes-
tations characteristic of HPS
in humans. Rodents can con-
tinue to excrete virus in their
Table. Seropositivity of humans and rodents from episodes in which clustering
of human hantaviral infections were identified in the United States
Household Nonhousehold      Site Seropositive
  contacts   contacts  contactsa   rodents
No. Positive No. Positive No. Positive   Rodents    Positive /
Episode (No. tested) (No. tested) (No. tested) No. trappedb No. tested (%)
1 0 (5) 0 (19) 0 (0) nd nd
2 3 (9) 0 (11) 0 (0) 40 8/27  (30)
3 1 (7) 0 (0) 0 (0) 87 15/41 (37)
4 1 (2) 0 (20) 0 (9) 80 7/80 (9)
5 1 (1) 0 (2) 0 (0) nd nd
aPersons with exposure to the home or worksite of the index patient but without
exposure to the patient
bTrapping occurred in and around index patient’s home/worksite
nd= not done364 Emerging Infectious Diseases Vol. 3, No. 3, July–September 1997
Dispatches
urine, saliva, and feces for prolonged periods
despite the presence of serum antibodies.
Hantaviruses have been isolated (albeit with
difficulty) from infected rodents but not from
tissues of HPS patients. Viral RNA is plentiful,
however, and frequently can be amplified by
reverse transcriptase and polymerase chain reac-
tion (RT-PCR) from the blood and tissues of HPS
patients. When the amino acid composition of
viral proteins from HPS patients (coded for by
these RT-PCR products) from southern Argentina
was compared with that of other New World
hantaviruses, differences varied from 13.6% to
23.9% for fragments of the G2 protein regions and
from 8.5% to 12.5% for a 528 base pair fragment
of the amino terminal region of the nucleocapsid
protein (11). Thus, SNV (the etiologic agent
responsible for most hantaviral infections in the
United States) is phylogentically related to,
but clearly distinct from, the Argentinean
hantavirus, provisionally named Andes virus.
The rodent host for the southern Argentinean
virus is Oligoryzomys longicaudatus, a species
not found in North America (12).
Milder disease was not a feature of the
southern Argentinean outbreak; but interestingly,
two patients with mild disease were identified in
our search for HPS clusters. A small amount of
mild disease resulting from SNV infection
probably goes unrecognized in the United States.
For example, in episodes 3 and 4, a diagnosis of
febrile illness in the first patients was made only
after the more severe course of HPS in the later
patients led to testing for hantaviral antibodies.
Hantaviral antibodies in sera from only 78 U.S.
residents (in addition to the 160 confirmed
patients) were identified by the Centers for
Disease Control and Prevention, despite testing
sera from approximately 7,000 U.S. residents as
part of diagnostic work-ups, surveys of potential
high-risk populations, and blinded population
surveys.
Whether the secondary transmission of HPS
observed in Argentina is a feature peculiar to
hantaviruses in southern Argentina or a rare
interaction between host and virus pertinent to
all members of the genus is not known. In
outbreaks associated with some highly pathogenic
viruses (e.g., Ebola virus), “super-spreaders”
(patients who transmit virus to many persons)
have been an important factor in ongoing trans-
mission of disease (A.S. Khan, pers. comm.). It is
unlikely that such a phenomenon was solely
responsible for the 1996 outbreak of HPS in sou-
thern Argentina, however, because multiple chains
of transmission appear to have occurred (3).
This investigation highlights the importance
of maintaining surveillance systems for emerging
diseases such as HPS. Five clusters of patients in
the U.S. HPS case registry were not unexpected
on the basis of previous experience with hanta-
viral diseases. Although person-to-person trans-
mission of SNV cannot be completely excluded,
the clusters were consistent with the exposure of
multiple persons to infected rodents. Thorough
future investigation of clusters of SNV-infected
patients will be important, but now it appears
that existing recommendations have been suf-
ficient to prevent secondary transmission of
HPS in the United States.
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